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Abstract
This paper examines the formation of Free Trade Agreements between the countries with
different cost conditions in the world where imcompletely substitutable goods are traded.
We see that each country levies higher (lower) tariffs to a country with lower (higher)
marginal cost when the substitutability between goods is sufficiently low. Further, we
obtain that each country has an incentive to form FTA with a higher marginal cost-country
and the countries which have similar marginal costs are likely to form FTA. It is also shown
that gains from FTA decrease (increase) as FTA-partners’ marginal costs become higher
(lower).
Keywords: Free Trade Agreement, cost condition, social welfare
JEL Classification: F15
1 Introduction
Recently forming FTA have increased in the world. Representative examples are EU,
NAFTA and AFTA. Japan has signed FTA with Singapore and Mexico and negotiates with
other ASEAN countries now. Although many countries try to sign FTA with other countries,
can they gain from the formation of FTA? Kemp and Wan (1976) showed that there exists
tariff vectors, under which potential members gain from FTA and non-members don’t lose from
CU. Panagariya and Krishna (2002) showed the case of FTA. But the tariff vectors that they
showed need not be optimal tariff vector. Further partner countries may be not able to adjust
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1
their tariff soon for some reason such as existence of a political process. FTA need not be
beneficial for each country. So, what conditions makes FTA between countries beneficial? This
issue is main topic in this paper.
The preceding research about this topic has been based mainly on the partial equilibrium
analysis. The representative study is Viner (1950). But the analysis based on the partial equi-
librium is restrictive in the way that the substitutablity between goods are ignored. Krugman
(1991) and Bond and Syropoulos (1996) noticed that point. Nevertheless their model are not
realistic. They ignored the cost conditions which countries have. They didn’t study the relation
between a cost condition and an incentive to form FTA. Which does the low technology country
have an incentive to form FTA with low technology country or hightechnology country? This
is the one of important issues. So in our paper we take into account the substilutablity be-
tween goods and investigate the incentive to form FTA in terms of differences in cost conditions
countries have.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and derive the market
equilibrium. We show a welfare effect decomposition arising from a change in tariffs, which is
seen in tariff theory. We also analyze how optimal tariffs are changed by marginal cost changes.
In Section 3 we analyze each country’s incentive to form FTA. Section 4 is a conlusion of our
paper.
2 The Model
We assume the world consists of n countries (n ≥ 2), each of which has an identical
representative consumer who consumes a numeraire good and a continuum of horizontally
differentiated commodities that are indexed by ω ∈ [0, 1]1. Each differentiated good is produced
by one firm. The firm has a constant marginal cost technology. The firms in a same country
have a same marginal cost whereas the firms in different countries do not necessarily have a
same marginal cost. We assume that there is no entry of firms into each industry. Each firm is
owned by a domestic consumer who receives all firm’s profit. On the other hand, the numeraire
good is produced competitively. A consumer in each country is endowed with L unit of labor,
1The following assumptions and model is mainly based on Furusawa and Konishi (2002). We introduced the
cost condition into their model. In this paper, we focus on the effect of cost condition on incentives to form
FTA. It is our originality.
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which is used for production of differentiated goods and a numeraire good. One unit of labor
produces one unit of the numeraire good, so that the wage rate is 1.
In country i (i = 1, 2, · · · , n), measure si of firms are located, in other words, measure si
of differentiated goods are produced. We assume that all markets are segmented so that firms
can perfectly price differentiated among different countries. Country i imposes a specific tariff
tij on the imports from country j. For simplicity, we assume that there is no commodity tax
on domestic goods and same tariff rate tij is imposed on all imports from country j. On the
other hand, the numeraire good is traded freely in the world. Tariff revenue is redistributed to
the domestic consumer.
2.1 Comsumer Demands
A utility function that a representative consumer in country i is given by the following
quasi-linear utility function:
U i = α
∫ 1
0
qi(ω)dω − β
2
∫ 1
0
qi(ω)2dω − δ
2
[∫ 1
0
qi(ω)dω
]2
+ qi0, (1)
where qi : [0, 1]→ R+ is an integrable consumption function, and qi0 denotes a quantity of the
numeraire good. The coefficient of the last second term δ means the substitutability among
differentiated goods. Let yi denote the consumer in country i. Then, the budget constraint
can be written as
yi =
∫ 1
0
p˜i(ω)qi(ω)dω + qi0, (2)
where p˜i : [0, 1] → R+ denotes the consumer price function. The first order condition for the
consumer’s utility maximization problem gives us the inverse demand function for each good
ω:
p˜i(ω) = α− βqi(ω)− δQi, (3)
where Qi =
∫ 1
0 q
i(ω)dω. Qi represents the average comsumer’s demand in country i.
2.2 Equilibrium in Country i
Let pk(ω) denote the production price of good ω for country k. We assume that all the firms
in country j have technologies of a constant marginal cost cj . The firm ω in country j chooses
the set of output {qk(ω)}nk=1 in order to maximize its profits pi(ω) =
∑n
k=1{pk(ω)− cj}qk(ω).
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The first order condition for this maximization gives us
qi(ω) =
α
2β
− δ
2β
Qi − 1
2β
(tij + cj). (4)
Notice that qi(ω) does not vary with ω. Output of the good depends only on the exporting
country’s marginal cost cj , the importing country’s tariff tij and total average consumer’s de-
mand in the importing country Qi. For simplicity, we henceforth suppress the argument ω and
let qij denote country i’s demand produced in the country j. We can rewrite equation (4) as
the quasi-reaction function:
qij = r
i
j(Q
i) =
1
2β
(α− δQi − tij − cj). (5)
In equilibrium, Qi = Ri(Qi) holds, where Ri(Qi) =
∑n
k=1 skr
i
k(Q
i). Then, the equilibrium
average output (Qi)e is as follows.
(Qi)e =
α− t¯i − c¯
2β + δ
. (6)
t¯i and c¯ represent the average import tariff charged by country i (
∑n
k=1 skt
i
k) and the average
marginal cost (
∑n
k=1 skck), respectively. We assume that (Q
i)e is positive. This is represented
as the following Assumption 1.
Assumption 1: We assume that the following inequality is satisfied, i.e., t¯i < α− c¯.
This ensures existence of equilibrium average output (Qi)e. We also assume that this
equilibrium is stable. As we know, the stability condition 2 is
∣∣dRi(Qi)/dQi∣∣ < 1. This
condition can be rewritten as the following Assumption 2.
Assumption 2: The substitutability δ is sufficiently small, i.e., δ < 2β.
Furthermore we assume that all countries produce or can produce their goods. This as-
sumption is represented as the following Assumption 3.
Assumption 3: The demand size is sufficiently large, i.e., α > cj (j=1, 2, . . . , n).
2In this paper, we use the following adjustment process: Qit = R
i(Qit−1), where Q
i
t means average output at
the t th period.
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Unless this assumption is satisfied, even when tariffs are not imposed on the goods, the
goods are not produced since the demand curve intersects with the marginal cost curve. Under
Assumption 1, 2, and 3, we drive the equilibrium output and producer price. Substituting (6)
into (5) yields the equilibrium consumer’s demand in country i for a commodity produced in
country j, as the function of country i’s tariff vector ti = (ti1, · · · , tin), marginal cost vector
c = (c1, · · · , cn), and variety share vector of differentiated goods s = (s1, · · · , sn):
qij(t
i, c, s) =
α
2β + δ
− 1
2β
(tij + cj) +
δ
2β(2β + δ)
(t¯i + c¯).
Then it follows from (3) that the equilibrium producer price which each firm in country j
charges for the market of country i is
pij(t
i, c, s) =
αβ
2β + δ
− 1
2
(tij − cj) +
δ
2(2β + δ)
(t¯i + c¯).
Note that pij(t
i, c, s) = βqij(t
i, c, s) + cj holds for any tariff vector ti, any marginal cost vector
c, and any variety share vector s. We find the following results from these demands and prices,
Result:
∂qij
∂tij
= −2β + δ(1− sj)
2β(2β + δ)
< 0,
∂qij
∂tik
=
skδ
2β(2β + δ)
> 0 (∀k 6= j),
∂pij
∂tij
= −2β + δ(1− sj)
2(2β + δ)
< 0,
∂pij
∂tik
=
skδ
2(2β + δ)
> 0 (∀k 6= j),
∂qij
∂cj
= −2β + δ(1− sj)
2β(2β + δ)
< 0,
∂qij
∂ck
=
skδ
2β(2β + δ)
> 0 (∀k 6= j),
∂pij
∂cj
=
2β + δ(1 + sj)
2(2β + δ)
> 0,
∂pij
∂ck
=
skδ
2β(2β + δ)
> 0 (∀k 6= j).
It should be also noticed that qij and p
i
j (j 6= i) don’t depend on the tariffs imposed by the
countries other than country i. It stems from the assumption that all markets are segmented.
2.3 Social Welfare
Under the world tariff vector t = (t1, · · · , tn), each firm in country i earns the profits:
pii(t, c, s) =
n∑
k=1
{pki (tk, c, s)− ci}qki (tk, c, s).
Country i’s tariff revenue is
T i(ti, c, s) =
n∑
k=1
skt
i
kq
i
k(t
i, c, s).
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A representative consumer’s income is the sum of labor income, redistributed tariff revenue,
and the profit of all the firms in country i:
yi = Li + T i(ti, c, s) + sipii(t, c, s).
Then it follows from (2) that
qi0(t, c, s) = y
i −
n∑
k=1
sk{pik + tik}qik,
= −
∑
k 6=i
skp
i
kq
i
k + si
∑
k 6=i
pki q
k
i − sici
n∑
k=1
qki + L
i.
Here we omit the independent variables of functions to keep notation to a minimum. Substi-
tuting this equilibrium demand into (1), we obtain
W i = α
n∑
k=1
skq
i
k −
β
2
n∑
k=1
sk(qik)
2 − δ
2
[
n∑
k=1
skq
i
k
]2
−
∑
k 6=i
skp
i
kq
i
k + si
∑
k 6=i
pki q
k
i − sici
n∑
k=1
qki + L
i,
=W i(p,q, c, s).
q and p represent the equilibrium consumers’ demand vector in the world q = (q11, · · · , q1n, · · · , qn1 , · · · , qnn)
and the equilibrium producers’ price vector p = (p11, · · · , p1n, · · · , pn1 , · · · , pnn), respectively. In
equilibrium q and p depend on the world tariff vector t, the marginal cost vector c, and the
variety vector s. Then we gives the following definition of welfare function.
Ŵ i(t, c, s) =W i(p(t, c, s),q(t, c, s), c, s)
Note that the welfare function W i can be decomposed as below3,
W i = V i −M i + Ei − TCi + Li, (7)
where
V i = α
n∑
k=1
qik −
β
2
n∑
k=1
sk(qik)
2 − δ
2
[
n∑
k=1
skq
i
k
]2
,
M i =
∑
k 6=i
skp
i
kq
i
k, E
i =
∑
k 6=i
sip
k
i q
k
i , TC
i =
n∑
k=1
siciq
k
i .
3See Furusawa and Konishi (2004) about this decomposition.
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V i represents consumer’s gross utility. Ei and M i represent export payments of country i
and import payment of country i, respectively. TCi stands for the total cost of production in
country i. Thus, country i’s welfare increases if Ei increases or M i and TCi decrease. At first
glance, country i’s seems to have an incentive to impose higher tariffs on foreign countries so as
to decrease country i’s imports. However, this is not necessarily true. Consider the case where
country i levies a higher tariff on country j. Then country i’s imports from country j decrease.
In spite of that, total imports of country i may increase since prices of goods from the other
foreign countries in country i become relatively lower than country j and country i’s imports
from these countries increase. Moreover, TCi becomes large because prices of goods produced
in country i also becomes relatively lower than goods produced in country j and demands for
goods produced in country i (or supplies) become large.
For our convenience we derive the differential coefficient of country i’s welfare function over
tij .
∂Ŵ i
∂tij
=
n∑
k=1
∂V i
∂qik
∂qik
∂tij
−
∑
k 6=i
skq
i
k
∂pik
∂tij
−
∑
k 6=i
skp
i
k
∂qik
∂tij
− sici∂q
i
i
∂tij
,
=
n∑
k=1
sk(pik + t
i
k)
∂qik
∂tij
−
∑
k 6=i
skq
i
k
∂pik
∂tij
−
∑
k 6=i
skp
i
k
∂qik
∂tij
− sici∂q
i
i
∂tij
,
=
∑
k 6=i
skt
i
k
∂qik
∂tij
+ si(pii − ci)
∂qii
∂tij
−
∑
k 6=i
skq
i
k
∂pik
∂tij
.
The first term in the second equation results from the fact that the marginal utility ∂V i/∂qik
is equal to the consumer price p˜ik = p
i
k + t
i
k. Then
∂Ŵ i
∂tij
= −
∑
k 6=i
skq
i
k
∂pik
∂tij
+ si(pii − ci)
∂qii
∂tij
+
∑
k 6=i
skt
i
k
∂qik
∂tij
(8)
Therefore we can find that the effect of country i’s tariff tij on its welfare Ŵ
i is decomposed
into three effects. The first, second, and third term are called terms of trade effect, allocation
effect, and tariff revenue effect respectively4. Terms of trade effect means how improvement
of terms of trade through raising the tariff influences the welfare. Resource allocation effect
means how increasing production by raising the tariff influences the welfare when allocation is
not efficient. Tariff revenue effect is that of increasing the tariff revenue by raising the tariff.
4This decomposition follows from Bond (1990) and Kowalczyk (2000)
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2.4 Optimal Tariffs
In this subsection we derive the optimal tariffs. Before doing this, we see the concavity of
the welfare function. We gave the assumption about the substitutability δ above(Assumption
2). We put the stronger assumption here. This is the following Assumption 4.
Assumption 4: The substitutability δ satisfies δ < β/2.
We obtain Lemma 1 when Assumption 4 is satisfied.
Lemma 1: Let Assumption 4 be satisfied. Then Ŵ i is concave in ti.
Proof : see Appendix.
Now we can derive the optimal tariffs which country i chooses to maximize its welfare by
Lemma 1. The first order condition is
∂
∂tij
Ŵ i(t, c, s) = 0 j = 1, 2, . . . , n j 6= i. (9)
Solving this simultaneous equations, we obtain the optimal tariffs and an important result
about this optimal tariffs. This is shown by Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: The optimal tariff is positive.
Proof : see Appendix.
Now we define the optimal tariff imposed by country i on the imports from country j as
(tij)
∗:
(tij)
∗ = tij(c, s). (10)
At first glance (9) seems to give us the optimal tariff function of c, s, and the tariff vector of
other countries t−i. As we show in Appendix, the first order differential coefficients of country
i’s welfare function over its tariffs for the other countries do not depend on the other countries’
tariffs, i.e.,
∂2Ŵ i
∂tkh∂t
i
j
= 0 ∀k 6= i ∀h 6= j.
Thus the optimal tariffs rely only on c and s.
Heceforth, for simplicity, we continue to assume that all the countries have the same variety
share (si = s = 1/n, i = 1, 2, · · ·n). Then we can calculate and derive optimal tariffs by solving
multiple equations (9). This result is given by Lemma 3.
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Lemma 3: Country i’s optimal tariff levied on country j is
(tij)
∗ =
Aij
3{12β2 + 4(1 + 2s)βδ + s(1 + 2s)δ2} > 0, (11)
where Aij = 12(α− cj)β2 + 4(c¯− cj − 4sci − 2sc¯+ 3sα)βδ+ (sc¯− 9sci − scj + 2s2ci − 2s2cj)δ2.
2.5 Comparative Statics
In above subsection, we derived the optimal tariffs in the case where countries’ variety
shares are same in the world. For tractability, we continue to assume that this holds. In
this subsection, using Lemma 3, we analyze the effect of the change in a domestic country i’s
marginal cost and foreign countries’ marginal costs on the optimal domestic country i’s tariffs.
The foreign countries’ marginal costs are divided into two groups. If we focus on the tariff
(tij)
∗, the country j’s marginal cost and the marginal costs of the countries other than country
j are so. In view of these divisions we conduct the comparative statistics. Then we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: When Assumption 1, 3, and 4 are satisfied and all the countries have the same
variety share (i.e., s = 1/n), the optimal tariffs have the following relations to marginal costs
5.
(i)
∂(tij)
∗
∂ci
= − 4(3 + 2s)βδ + 3s(3− s)
3{12β2 + 4(1 + 2s)βδ + s(1 + 2s)δ2} < 0,
(ii)
∂(tij)
∗
∂cj
= −12β
2 + 4(1− s+ 2s2)βδ + s(1 + s)δ2
3{12β2 + 4(1 + 2s)βδ + s(1 + 2s)δ2} < 0,
(iii)
∂(tij)
∗
∂ck
=
4s(1− 2s)βδ + s2δ2
3{12β2 + 4(1 + 2s)βδ + s(1 + 2s)δ2} > 0 (k 6= i, j).
In order to understand an implication of Proposition 1, consider the following functions,
tij = r
i
j(t
i
−j , c, s) = argmax
tij
Ŵ i(t, c, s)
where ti−j = (t
i
1, · · · , tij−1, tij+1, · · · , tin). This function satisfies
5We can show that when strengthening Assumption 2’ a little, even though an importing country has a
variety share s and each exporting country has a variety share (1− s)/(n− 1), we obtain the same result as the
one of Proposition 1. The result of Proposition 1 is relatively robust in this sense.
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(a)
∂rij
∂ci
= − 2(1− s)β + (1− 2s)δ
12β2 + 2(6− 3s− s2)βδ + (3− 3s− 2s2)δ2 < 0
(b)
∂rij
∂cj
= − 4β
2 + 2(2− s− s2)βδ + (1− s− 2s2)δ2
12β2 + 2(6− 3s− s2)βδ + (3− 3s− 2s2)δ2 < 0
(c)
∂rij
∂ck
=
sδ{2β + δ + 2(β + δ)s}
12β2 + 2(6− 3s− s2)βδ + (3− 3s− 2s2)δ2 > 0
In words, increase in an importing country i’s marginal cost or an exporting country j’s marginal
cost shifts the curve rijr
i
j inward while increase in other exporting country k’s marginal cost
shifts the curve rijr
i
j outward. On the other hand, effects of changes in the tariffs imposed on
other countries on the function rij are
∂rij
∂tik
=
δ{3(2β + δ) + 2(β + δ)s}
12β2 + 2(6− 3s− s2)βδ + (3− 3s− 2s2)δ2 (k 6= i, j) > 0. (12)
For simplicity, consider the case where country 1 determines the optimal tariffs in 3-country
model. This is drawn in Figure 1 and 2 as r1j r
1
j (j = 2, 3). The curve r
1
j r
1
j is of upward-sloping
from (12). We explain the reason for this. The sign of ∂2Ŵ 1/∂t1k∂t
1
j determines the slope of
the curve r1j r
1
j .
∂2Ŵ 1
∂t1k∂t
1
j
=
∑
h6=1
sh
∂q1h
∂t1k
∂p1h
∂t1j
+ s1
∂q11
∂t1j
∂p11
∂t1k
+ sk
∂q1k
∂t1j
(k 6= j).
The first, second, and third terms on the right-hand side are the changes in terms of trade
effect, allocation effect, and trade revenue effect, respectively. The signs of the changes in
allocation effect and trade revenue effect are necessarily positive but the one in terms of trade
effect is ambiguous. However, from (12), we know that ∂2Ŵ 1/∂t1k∂t
1
j is positive. The changes
in tariff revenue effect and allocation effect dominate the one in terms of trade effect. This
makes marginal welfare of the tariff on country j large and country 1 has an incentive to raise
the tariff on country j. Thus, the curve r1j r
1
j is upward-sloping as in Figure 1 and 2. The
equilibrium is represented by E in Figure 1 and 2.
[INSERT Figure 1]
[INSERT Figure 2]
Next we try to analyze how optimal tariffs change as marginal costs change. We can do it
by checking the ∂2Ŵ 1/∂c1∂t1j , ∂
2Ŵ 1/∂cj∂t
1
j , and ∂
2Ŵ 1/∂ck∂t
1
j in the same way as the above.
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By doing a little arithmetic, we find that allocation effect determines the sign of (a) and the
terms of trade effect determines the sign of (b) and (c). These facts tell us two important
things. First, the curve r1j r
1
j shifts outward if country 1’s marginal cost becomes lower. This
is drawn in Figure 1. Then, the equilibrium changes into E′ and country 1 raises the tariffs
on country 2 and 3. This is because if country 1 lowers the tariffs, then goods produced in
efficient country 1 are substituted for goods produced in relatively inefficient country 2 and
3 and this fact makes large distortion. Second, we also see that if country 2’s marginal cost
decreases, then the curve r12r
1
2 and r
1
3r
1
3 shift outward and inward, respectively. This is drawn
in Figure 2. Then, the equilibrium changes into E′ and country 1 raises the tariff on country
2 and lowers the tariff on country 3. When country 2’s marginal cost lowers, if country 1
decreases the tariff on country 2, then terms of trade for country 2 worsens largely and country
1’s welfare decreases. Similarly, if country 1 increases the tariff on country 3, then terms of
trade for country 2 and country 1’s welfare decreases.
3 Incentive to Form FTA
In this section we discuss the incentives for countries to form FTA. Each country has an
incentive to form FTA if a partner and it improve their welfare when they eliminate their tariffs
on the partner. To analyze this incentive, we define the country i’s benefit from FTA between
country i and j as follows.
Definition: The country i’s benefit from FTA between country i and j, ∆Ŵ i is defined as
∆Ŵ i = Ŵ i(tijF , s, c)− Ŵ i(t∗, s, c). (13)
where t∗ = (t1∗, . . . , tk∗, . . . , tn∗) is the world optimal tariff vector, ti∗ = ((ti1)∗, · · · , (tin)∗) is
country i’s optimal tariff vector, and tijF is the tariff vector , the elements of which are
tkh = (t
k
h)
∗ (h, k 6= i, j), tih = (tih)∗ (h 6= j), tjh = (tih)∗ and tij = tji = 0.
FTA between two countries may be beneficial for one country but be not for the other.
Under no transfer, the country which loses from FTA does not have an incentive to form FTA.
If the country which obtain the benefit from FTA transfers to the other country and both
countries obtain higher welfare than before forming FTA, both countries may have incentives
to form FTA. So, we utilize the joint welfare function to examine what condition should be
satisfied for two countries to form FTA. The joint welfare function between country i and j is
11
Ŵ i,j(t, s, c) = Ŵ i(t, s, c) + Ŵ j(t, s, c). (14)
We assume that this joint welfare function has the following property:
Assumption 5: The joint welfare function Ŵ i,j(t, s, c) is concave in (ti, tj).
By using equation (13) and (14), both countries’ benefit from FTA is given by
∆Ŵ i,j = Ŵ i,j(tijF , s, c)− Ŵ i,j(t∗, s, c). (15)
Since the joint welfare function Ŵ i,j(t, s, c) is concave in (ti, tj) by Assumption 5,
∆Ŵ i,j ≥ −(tij)∗
∂
∂tij
Ŵ i,j((t−i)∗, (ti−j)
∗, 0, s, c)− (tji )∗
∂
∂tji
Ŵ i,j((t−j)∗, (tj−i)
∗, 0, s, c), (16)
where (t−k)∗ represents optimal tariff vector that all the country other than country k impose
and (tk−h)
∗ represents the optimal tariff vector that country i imposes on all the countries other
than country j. LHS in this equation is positive if RHS is positive. We know that the optimal
tariffs are positive. Then we see ∂Wˆ i,j((t−i)∗, (ti−j)
∗, 0, s, c)/∂tij . This is calculated as follows,
∂
∂tij
cW i,j((t−i)∗, (ti−j)∗, 0, s, c) = sδ
4β(2β + δ)2
{4β + (3 + 2s)δ}
X
k 6=i,j
s(tik)
∗ − s
2β(2β + δ)2
{2(1− s)βδ + 2β2}α
− sδ
4β(2β + δ)2
{(3− s)βδ + δ2}c¯+ sβδ
4β2(2β + δ)
X
k 6=i
sck +
s
4β
cj − s
2δ
4β(2β + δ)
ci.
The second line in RHS is negative by doing a little arithmetic. The first line can be rewritten
as
s
4β(2β + δ)2
4β
δ ∑
k 6=i,j
s(tik)
∗ − αβ
+ δ
(3 + 2s)δ ∑
k 6=i,j
s(tik)
∗ − 4(1− s)αβ

 .
The first term in the brackets is negative because of Assumption 1 and 4. Under Assumption
1 and 4 the second term in brackets is
12
δ(3 + 2s)δ ∑
k 6=i,j
s(tik)
∗ − 4(1− s)αβ
 < αδ{(3 + 2s)δ − 4(1− s)β} (by Assumption 1),
< {2(3 + 2s)− 4(1− s)}αβδ (by Assumption 4),
< 0.
Hence we obtain that the sign of ∂Ŵ i,j((t−i)∗, (ti−j)
∗, 0, s, c)/∂tij relies on the sign of scj/4β−
s2δci/4β(2β + δ). Namely the sign of RHS in inequality (14) depends on the sign of
−(tij)∗
{
s
4β
cj − s
2δ
4β(2β + δ)
ci
}
− (tji )∗
{
s
4β
ci − s
2δ
4β(2β + δ)
cj
}
,
because we get the similar result from ∂Ŵ i,j((t−j)∗, (tj−i)
∗, 0, s, c)/∂tji too. If this is positive,
RHS in (16) is positive. This condition can be written as
{
−(tij)∗ +
sδ
2β + δ
(tji )
∗
}
ci +
{
−(tji )∗ +
sδ
2β + δ
(tij)
∗
}
cj > 0. (17)
(17) is satisfied when both two terms are positive in (17). In other words,
sδ
2β + δ
<
(tij)
∗
(tji )∗
<
2β + δ
sδ
(18)
Proposition 2: When all the countries have the same variety share and Assumption 1, 4, and
5 are satisfied, if two countries impose the tariffs that satisfy the condition (16), then the two
countries have incentives to form FTA.
Proposition 2 tells us that if two countries levies similar optimal tariff on each other, then
they have incentives to form FTA. Intuitively, there are two points to explain this fact. First,
FTA means that imports from the partner increase while exports to the partner increase. We
find from Result 1 that the effects of eliminateing the tariff on exports to and imports from
the partner is similar between FTA partners since all countries have same variety shares and
FTA partners levies similar tariffs on each other. Changes in trade flows between partners
are roughly offset. Thus from (7), this does not influence both countries’ welfare. Second,
eliminating the tariff on the partner means that prices of goods from the rest of the world
become relatively lower than the one from the partner. Thus imports from the rest of the
world decrease. From (7), this leads to an increase in both FTA partners’ welfare.
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Corollary : If two countries have the same marginal costs, then they have incentives to form
FTA with each other.
Note that an FTA deteriorates welfare of the rest of the world. In fact, consider the change
in welfare of country k in the rest of the world when country i and j form FTA. From (7),
∂Ŵ k
∂tij
=
∂
∂tij
sk∑
h6=k
(phk − ck)qhk
 = sksjδ
2β + δ
> 0.
Hence, FTA between country i and j results in a decrease in welfare of the rest of world.
Neverthless, the countries in the rest of the world may accept the FTA if adjustment of tariffs
after forming FTA between country i and j is considered. Countries in the rest of the world
don’t have incentives to change their tariffs since determining tariffs on country i and j don’t
depend on tariffs imposed by country i and j. On the other hand, country i and j have
incentives to change their tariffs imposed on the rest of the world. We show that. Evaluated
at tij = 0, t
i
k = (t
i
k)
∗ (k 6= i, j), in words, if country i imposes the same tariffs (i.e., optimal
tariffs levied before FTA) on the rest of the world even after FTA,
∂Ŵ
∂tik
= −
∑
h6=i
shq
i
h
∂pih
∂tik
+ si(pii − ci)
∂qii
∂tik
+
∑
h6=i,j
sht
i
h
∂qih
∂tik
=
sksjδ(tij)
∗
4β(2β + δ)2
δ ∑
h6=i,j,k
sh − 8β − δ(4− sk − sj)− siδ

< 0,
where the second equality follows from envelope theorem and Result 1.
Thus, country i has an incentive to lower the tariffs imposed on the foreign countries other
than FTA partner, country j, since country i’s welfare function Ŵ i satisfies the second order
condition. The rest of the world can enjoy an increase in exports to FTA partners through
such adjustment of tariffs by country i and j. Even if country i and j sign to form FTA and
the other countries suffer from a decrease in exports to FTA partners by forming FTA between
country i and j itself, then the countries’ welfare in the rest of the world may improve as long
as FTA partners adjust their tariffs levied on the others. This is because an increase in exports
to FTA partners through country i’s and j’s adjustment of tariffs may offset by decrease in
export to them by forming FTA itself (or, by setting tij and t
j
i to zero).
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When we consider adjustment of tariffs after FTA just like the above, we can obtain the
following important proposition about the relationship between gains from FTA and each
country’s cost condition.
Proposition 3: When a country has the same marginal cost as a potential partner, if they
have lower marginal costs, then they gain higher benefits from FTA.
Proof : see Appendix.
That is, the higher marginal costs of FTA partners become, the lower their welfare becomes.
the higher marginal costs mean that marginal costs of the countries in the rest of the world are
relatively lower. Thus FTA leads to largely worsening the terms of trade of FTA partners for
the other countries. According to Viner’s terminology, FTA generates a big trade diversion.
This diversion lowers gains from FTA. Neverthless, from Proposition 2, FTA between country
i and j guarantees increase in their welfare for them as long as their marginal costs are same.
4 Concluding Remarks
To understand the relations between each country’s incentive to form FTA with another
country and cost condition, we utilized the model in which incompletely substituables are
traded. In particular we could get a grasp of the fact that the subtitutability δ plays an
important role. We have found that if δ is sufficiently low, then each country imposes a
higher (lower) tariff on a lower (higher) marginal cost-country and raises tariffs on one country
when another country’s marginal cost lower (Proposition 1). The latter result is different from
that of Kiyono (1993), which led to the adverse result by using the model where a complete
substitutable is traded. We also have found that each country has an incentive to form FTA
with a higher marginal cost-country (Proposition 2) and two countries with similar marginal
costs are likely to form FTA with each other (Proposition 3). Propostion 2 may show that FTA
with Singapore and Mexico who have relatively high cost condition gives Japan the benefit. On
the other hand, Proposition 3 may show that AFTA or MERCOSUR are beneficial. Hoever we
must not forget that these results depend on the assumption that partners and non-partners
don’t change their tariffs after FTA formation. How do our propositions change without this
assumption? This issue is important. We leave this extension for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let the Hessian of country i’s welfare function Ŵ i denote |H|. Then |H| is
|H| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2Ŵ i
∂(ti1)2
∂2Ŵ i
∂ti2∂t
i
1
. . .
∂2Ŵ i
∂tin∂t
i
1
∂2Ŵ i
∂ti1∂t
i
2
∂2Ŵ i
∂(ti2)2
. . .
∂2Ŵ i
∂tin∂t
i
2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
∂2Ŵ i
∂ti1∂t
i
n
∂2Ŵ i
∂ti2∂t
i
n
. . .
∂2Ŵ i
∂(tin)2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∏
h6=i sh
{4β(2β + δ)2}n−1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−D1 s2δE s3δE s4δE . . . snδE
s1δE −D2 s3δE s4δE . . . snδE
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
s1δE s2δE s3δE s4δE . . . −Dn
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
where
∂2Ŵ i
∂(tij)2
= − sj
4β(2β + δ)2
Dj ,
∂2Ŵ i
∂tik∂t
i
j
=
sjskδ
2β(2β + δ)2
E
Dk = {2β + δ(1− sk)}{2β(1 + 2sk) + δ(1 + sk)}+ skδ2(1− sk) > 0
E = 8β + δ(4 + sk −
∑
h6=i
sh) > 0.
Let the k th principal minor of the Hessian denote |Hk|. By using the Hessian and the prin-
cipal minor |Hk|, we prove the concavity of country i’s welfare function. We do by using the
mathematical induction.
(I) m = 1, 2
|H1| = −D1 < 0, |H2| = D1D2 − δ2s1s2E2.
|H2| is positive under Assumption 4. We can rewrite |H2| the function of sj .
f(sj) ≡ −2δ(2β + δ)s2j + {8β2 − 4βδ − 2(1 + si)δ2}sj + (2β + δ)2 = |H2|.
16
Obviously f(sj) is positive for any s ∈ [0, 1] if f(1) is positive. Then we see the sign of f(1).
f(1) = 12β2 − 4βδ − (3 + 2si)δ2
> (12 · 2− 4)βδ − (3 + 2si)δ2 (by Assumption 4)
= 20βδ − (3 + 2i)δ2
> {10 · 2− (3 + 2si)} δ2
> 0.
Hence we obtain |H2| > 0.
(II) Let |Hk−1| satisfy the concavity condition, in other words,
sgn|Hk−1| =

+1 k − 1 = 2t
−1 k − 1 = 2t− 1
(19)
We can write out |Hk| as follows.
|Hk| = Πh6=ish{4β(2β + δ)2}k
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−D1 s1δE s3δE . . . skδE
s1δE +D1 −(s2δE +D2) 0 . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
s1δE +D1 0 0 . . . −(skδE +Dk)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −(skδE +Dk)|Hk−1|+ (−1)k+1{−(s1δE +D1)}|D0|.
|D0| represents the determinant of the cofactor corresponding to (k, 1) element. We focus on
|D0|.
|D0| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
s2δE s3δE s4δE . . . sk−1δE skδE
−(s2δE +D2) 0 0 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 . . . −(sk−1δE +Dk−1) 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
k−1∏
h=2
{(shδE +Dh)}(δE)k−1(−1)k−2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
s2 s3 s4 . . . sk−1 sk
1 0 0 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 . . . 1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
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=
k−1∏
h=2
sh{(shδE +Dh)}(δE)k−1(−1)k−2sk
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 0 . . . 0 1
1 0 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
k−1∏
h=2
sksh{(shδE +Dh)}(δE)k−1(−1)2(k−1)
> 0.
Hence we obtain |D0| > 0. Then we see the sign of |Hk| by considering both k = 2t and
k = 2t− 1.
(i) k = 2t
In this case |Hk−1| is negative. Hence
|Hk| = −(skδE +Dk)|Hk−1|+ (−1)k+1{−(s1δE +D1)}|D0|
= −(skδE +Dk)|Hk−1|+ (−1)2(t+1)(s1δE +D1)|D0|
> 0.
(ii)k = 2t− 1
In this case |Hk−1| is positive. Hence
|Hk| = −(skδE +Dk)|Hk−1|+ (−1)k+1{−(s1δE +D1)}|D0|
= −(skδE +Dk)|Hk−1|+ (−1)2t+1(s1δE +D1)|D0|
< 0.
From (i) , (ii), sgn|Hk−1| = −sgn|Hk|. Thus we found that Ŵ i is concave in ti. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2
First of all we redefine the welfare function as follows from the fact that pij = βq
i
j + cj .
Ŵ i(t, c, s) = W˜ i(q(t, c, s), c, s) =W i(βq(t, c, s),q(t, c, s), c, s).
Then the equations for deriving the optimal tariffs are
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∂Ŵ i
∂tij
=
n∑
k=1
∂W˜ i
∂qik
∂qik
∂tij
= 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , n, j 6= i.
We can rewrite these equations in the form of matrix:

∂W˜ i
∂qii
∂qii
∂ti1
...
∂W˜ i
∂qii
∂qii
∂tin
 =

−∂q
i
1
∂ti1
−∂q
i
2
∂ti1
. . . −∂q
i
n
∂ti1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
−∂q
i
1
∂tin
−∂q
i
2
∂tin
. . . −∂q
i
n
∂tin


∂W˜ i
∂qi1
...
∂W˜ i
∂qin
 . (20)
To prove the optimal tariff is positive, we show that the coefficient matrix of the equations
satisfies Hawkins-Simon condition with the mathematical induction. We define the determinant
of the coefficient matrix as ∆ and the determinant of the m th principal minor as ∆m.
(I) m = 1
∆m = −∂q
i
1
∂ti1
=
2β + δ(1− s1)
2β(2β + δ)
> 0.
(II) We assume that ∆m is positive when m = k. Then,
∆m+1 =
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛
−∂q
i
1
∂ti1
. . . −∂q
i
m+2
∂ti1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
−∂q
i
m+2
∂tim+2
. . . −∂q
i
m+2
∂tim+2
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛
=
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
2β + δ(1− s1)
2β(2β + δ)
− δs1
2β(2β + δ)
. . . − δs1
2β(2β + δ)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
− δsm+2
2β(2β + δ)
− δsm+2
2β(2β + δ)
. . .
2β + δ(1− sm+2)
2β(2β + δ)
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
= (−1)m+1
»
δ
2β(2β + δ)
–m+1Y
h 6=i
sh
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
−2β + δ(1− s1)
δs1
1 . . . 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 1 . . .
2β + δ(1− sm+2)
δsm+2
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
= (−1)m+1
»
δ
2β(2β + δ)
–m+1
2β + δ
δs1
Y
h6=i
sh
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
−2β + δ(1− s1)
2β + δ
1 1 . . . 1 1
1 −2β + δ
δs2
0 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 0 0 . . . 0 −2β + δ
δsm+2
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
˛˛˛˛
.
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Let the determinant of RHS in the last equation be ∆˜m+1. Then ∆˜m+1 is
∆˜m+1 = −2β + δ
δsm+2
∆¯m + (−1)m+2∆¯m
where
∆¯m =
(−1)m{ δ
2β(2β + δ)
}m 2β + δ
δs1
∏
h6=i
sh
−1∆m, ∆¯m =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 1 . . . 1 1
−2β + δ
δs2
0 . . . 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . −2β + δ
δsm+1
0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
We focus on ∆¯m. We can rewrite this as follows.
∆¯m = (−1)m−1
[
2β + δ
δ
]m−1 ∏
h6=1,i
s−1h
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 1 . . . 1 1
1 0 . . . 1 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . 1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (−1)2m−3
[
2β + δ
δ
]m−1 ∏
h6=1,i
s−1h .
By taking account on ∆¯m and ∆¯m, we see how the sign of ∆m+1 and of ∆˜m+1 are related.
In fact the relation between the two is sgn(∆m+1) = sgn{(−1)m+1∆˜m+1}. So, we show that
∆m+1 is positive as ∆m is so by showing (−1)m+1∆˜m+1 is positive. (−1)m+1∆˜m+1 satisfies
(−1)m+1∆˜m+1 = (−1)m+1
24−2β + δ
δsm+2
∆¯m + (−1)3m−1

2β + δ
δ
ffm−1 Y
h 6=1,i
s−1h
35
= −(−1)m+1 2β + δ
δsm+2
8<:(−1)m
„
δ
2β(2β + δ)
«m
2β + δ
δs1
Y
h 6=1,i
sh
9=;
−1
∆m
+ (−1)m+1(−1)3m−1

2β + δ
δ
ffm−1 Y
h6=1,i
s−1h
= (−1)m+1+1−m 2β + δ
δsm+2
8<:
„
δ
2β(2β + δ)
«m
2β + δ
δs1
Y
h 6=1,i
sh
9=;
−1
∆m
+ (−1)m+1+3m−1

2β + δ
δ
ffm−1 Y
h 6=1,i
s−1h
= (−1)2 2β + δ
δsm+2
8<:
„
δ
2β(2β + δ)
«m
2β + δ
δs1
Y
h 6=1,i
sh
9=;
−1
∆m + (−1)4m

2β + δ
δ
ffm−1 Y
h 6=1,i
s−1h
> 0.
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Hence we obtain that any principal minor of the coefficient is positive from (I), (II), so that the
simultaneous equations (8) satisfy Hawkins-Simon condition. Since the simultaneous equations
have non-negative solutions when the equations satisfy Hawkins-Simon condition, we see the
simultaneous equations (8) have non-negative solution ∂W˜ i/∂qij . Notice that
∂W˜ i
∂qij
= sj(tij − βqij) > 0.
Therefore we obtain the optimal tariffs (tij)
∗ is positive. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider FTA between country i and j. Further we assume that they have same marginal
costs (i.e., ci = cj). For convenience, we define the following welfare function.
W
i(c, s) = Ŵ i(t∗∗(c, s), c, s),
where t∗∗ is an optimal tariff vector after FTA and depends on a marginal cost vector c and a
variety share vector s. Then ∂W i/∂ci is
∂W
i
∂ci
=
∑
k 6=i,j
∂Ŵ i
∂tik
∂(tik)
∗∗
∂ci
+
∑
k 6=i,j
∂Ŵ i
∂tki
∂(tki )
∗∗
∂ci
+
∂Ŵ i
∂ci
=
∑
k 6=i,j
∂Wˆ i
∂tki
∂(tki )
∗∗
∂ci
+
∂Ŵ i
∂ci
.
The second line follows from envelope theorem. Similarly,
∂W
i
∂cj
=
∑
k 6=i,j
∂Ŵ i
∂tki
∂(tki )
∗∗
∂cj
+
∂Ŵ i
∂cj
.
Thus we show ∂W i/∂ci+∂W
i
/∂cj < 0 in order to prove Proposition 3. From Result, we know
that
∂Ŵ i
∂tki
= si
[
(pki − ci)
∂qki
∂tki
+ qki
∂pki
∂tki
]
= 2siβqki
∂qki
∂tki
< 0.
By Proposition 1, ∑
k 6=i,j
∂Ŵ i
∂tki
∂(tki )
∗∗
∂cj
< 0.
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Hence, in order to prove ∂W i/∂ci + ∂W
i
/∂cj < 0, it’s sufficient to show that
B =
∑
k 6=i,j
∂Ŵ i
∂tki
∂(tki )
∗∗
∂ci
+
∂Ŵ i
∂ci
+
∂Ŵ i
∂cj
< 0.
Simple calculations give us
∂Ŵ i
∂ci
= si
n∑
k=1
(pki − ci)
∂qki
∂ci
−
∑
k 6=i
skq
i
k
∂pik
∂ci
+
∑
k 6=i,j
sk(tik)
∗∗∂q
i
k
∂ci
−
n∑
k=1
skq
k
i + si
∑
k 6=i
qki
∂pki
∂ci
and
∂Ŵ i
∂cj
=
si(pii − ci)∂qii∂cj −∑
k 6=i
skq
i
k
∂pik
∂cj
+
∑
k 6=i,j
sk(tik)
∗∗∂q
i
k
∂cj
+ si∑
k 6=i
(pki − ci)
∂qki
∂cj
+ si
∑
k 6=i
qki
∂pki
∂cj
= si
∑
k 6=i
(pki − ci)
∂qki
∂cj
+ si
∑
k 6=i
qki
∂pki
∂cj
− sjqij .
The second equality of ∂Ŵ i/∂cj follows from Result (∂qik/∂cj = ∂q
i
k/∂t
i
j , ∂p
i
k/∂cj = ∂p
i
k/∂t
i
j ,
and ∂pij/∂cj = ∂p
i
j/∂t
i
j + 1) and envelope theorem. Then ∂Ŵ
i/∂ci + ∂Ŵ i/∂cj is
∂Ŵ i
∂ci
+
∂Ŵ i
∂cj
=
si(pii − ci)∂qii∂ci −
n∑
k 6=i
skq
i
k
∂pik
∂ci
+
∑
k 6=i,j
sk(tik)
∗∗∂q
i
k
∂ci

+ si
∑
k 6=i
(pki − ci)
(
∂qki
∂cj
+
∂qki
∂ci
)
+ si
∑
k 6=i
qki
(
∂pki
∂cj
+
∂pki
∂cj
)
− sjqij
<
∑
k 6=i,j
sk(tik)
∗∗∂q
i
k
∂ci
− si
n∑
k=1
qki .
Then, we show that B is negative.
B < −
∑
k 6=i
∂Ŵ i
∂tki
+
∂Ŵ i
∂ci
+
∂Ŵ i
∂cj
= −2siβ
∑
k 6=i
qki
∂qki
∂tki
+
∂Ŵ i
∂ci
+
∂Ŵ i
∂cj
< −2siβ
∑
k 6=i
qki
∂qki
∂tki
+
∑
k 6=i,j
sk(tik)
∗∗∂q
i
k
∂ci
− si
n∑
k=1
qki .
The first inequality follows from the fact that |∂(tki )∗/∂ci| < 1 as we know from Proposition 1.
When all the countries in the world have same variety shares, we can rewrite the last inequality.
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−2siβ
∑
k 6=i
qki
∂qki
∂tki
+
∑
k 6=i,j
sk(tik)
∗∗∂q
i
k
∂ci
− si
n∑
k=1
qki
=
{2β + δ(1− s)}s
2β + δ
∑
k 6=i
qki +
δs
2β(2β + δ)
t¯i − s
n∑
k=1
[
α
2β + δ
− t
k
i + ci
2β
+
δ(t¯k + c¯)
2β(2β + δ)
]
= s
2β + δ(1− s)
2β + δ
∑
k 6=i
qki −
∑
k 6=i
qki
− s [ α
2β + δ
− ci
2β
+
δc¯
2β(2β + δ)
]
= − δs
2
2β + δ
∑
k 6=i
qki − sqii(0, c, s)
< 0,
where 0 = (0, 0, · · · , 0). Hence, B is negative. The proposition was proved. ¤
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Figure 1: the case of decrease in c1
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Figure 2: the case of decrease in c2
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